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WILLIAM JAMES ON CONCEPTIONS AND 
PRIVATE LANGUAGE1
Abstract. William James was one of the most frequently cited authors in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, but the attention paid to James’s Principles of Psycho-
logy in that work is typically explained in terms of James having ‘committed in a clear, 
exemplary manner, fundamental errors in the philosophy of mind.’ (Goodman 2002, 
p. viii.) The most notable of these ‘errors’ was James’s purported commitment to a 
conception of language as ‘private’. Commentators standardly treat James as committed 
to a conception of language as private, and the most notorious instance of this 
commitment can purportedly be found in his discussion of the feelings associated with 
logical terms like ‘and’, ‘if ’ and ‘but’ in the Principles’s chapter, ‘The Stream of Thought’. 
However, the received view stands in need of serious re-evaluation. In particular, there 
is little reason to think that James’s notorious discussion of the ‘if-feeling’ should be 
understood as an attempt to give an account of the meaning of ‘if ’ (indeed, there is little 
reason to even think that Wittgenstein interpreted him this way). The picture of our 
ideas developed in ‘The Stream of Thought’ sits badly with any theory that identifies 
meanings with ideas in this way, and while James’s chapter on ‘Conception’ (as well as 
some portions of Some Problems of Philosophy) has also been portrayed as committing 
James to the in principle privacy of language, it will be argued here that James’s account 
of our ‘conceptions’ is radically different from that of the private linguist.
1. Introduction
William James was one of the most frequently cited authors in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (tied with Frege and behind only Augustine),2 but 
while Wittgenstein was famously a fan of James’s The Varieties of Religious 
Experience3 this attributed fondness is rarely extended to James’s Principles of 
1 I’d like to thank audience members in Chicago, Birmingham, Hamilton, Las Vegas, 
Helsinki, and Calgary for comments on earlier versions of this paper. I’d especially like 
to thank Russell Goodman and the late Richard Gale, both of whom gave generous 
feedback on earlier drafts. I’m focusing on the differences with them in what follows, but 
I’ve learnt a tremendous amount from both. Without the former, I’d not have thought 
seriously about the relation between Wittgenstein and James, and without the latter, I 
would not have thought seriously about James at all. 
2 See Goodman 2002 p. 61. 
3 He wrote to Russell in 1912 ‘This book does me a lot of good.’ (Von Wright, 1974, p. 10.)
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Psychology (hereafter ‘PP’). Indeed, Wittgenstein’s well-documented attention 
to the later book was often explained in terms of James being ‘a classical 
exponent of the tradition in the philosophy of mind that [Wittgenstein] 
was opposing’,4 and the received view of the relation between James and 
Wittgenstein is that ‘James was important to Wittgenstein primarily because 
he committed in a clear, exemplary manner, fundamental errors in the 
philosophy of mind’.5
The most notable of these ‘errors’ involved James’s purported commitment 
to a conception of language as ‘private’. As Richard Gale puts it in his The 
Divided Self of William James:
It is this commitment to an in-principle private language that 
earned James the distinction of being the major whipping boy of 
the latter Wittgenstein. One gets the feeling that Wittgenstein wrote 
his Philosophical Investigations with an open copy of The Principles 
of Psychology before him, especially the chapter of ‘The Stream of 
Thought’. (Gale 1999, p. 165)
Gale is certainly not alone in this view, and commentators standardly treat 
James as committing himself to a conception of language as private in the 
Principles’s ninth chapter, ‘The Stream of Thought’.
However, the received view stands in need of serious re-evaluation, 
and, in this respect, the reception of Wittgenstein’s work has had a largely 
pernicious effect on our understanding of James. In particular, the picture of 
our ideas developed in ‘The Stream of Thought’ sits badly with any theory that 
identifies meanings with ideas in the way that Wittgenstein targets. Further, 
while the Principles’s twelfth chapter, ‘Conception’ (as well as some portions 
of Some Problems of Philosophy), has also been portrayed as committing 
James to the privacy of language, it will be argued here that James’s account 
of our ‘conceptions’ is radically different from that of the private linguist, and 
that when James claims, for instance, that we are ‘the mind can always intend, 
and know when it intends, to think of the Same’ (PP 434), he isn’t referring to 
any sort of epistemic achievement.
4 Coope, Geach, Potts & White 1970, p.7. For some other instances of the received view, 
see Budd 1989 pp. 157–64, Fogelin 1987 pp. 176–7, Hacking 1982, Hacker 1990 (Ch. 2), 
1996 (Ch. 4–6), and Hilmy 1987 p. 198. For a discussion of some of these instances of 
this received view, see Boncompagni, 2012, p. 37, 2016, p. 6, and Goodman 2012, p. 62.
5 Goodman 2002, p. viii. I should note that Goodman is here describing rather than 
endorsing the received view. Goodman is mainly concerned with pushing back against 
that view, and he makes a persuasive case for Wittgenstein having in many respects 
not only ‘learned from’, but also ‘loved and trusted’ James (Goodman 2002, pp. 179, 3). 
That said, when it comes to the privacy of language, even Goodman seems willing to 
endorse the received view (and is thus happy to assume that James ‘would have been 
forced to acknowledge the force of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of his unrelieved empiricism’ 
(Goodman 2002, p. 179)). 
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2. The ‘if feeling’
While Wittgenstein discussed a number of topics from James’s Principles, we 
will start here with the passages relating to what Wittgenstein refers to as 
the ‘if-feeling of James’, since perhaps the most damaging effect of reading 
Wittgenstein and his commentators (at least vis a vis our understanding of 
James) is that it can leave one with the impression that James argued that the 
meanings of words like ‘and’, ‘if ’ and ‘but’ were the particular feelings that we 
had when we used those words.
Wittgenstein’s arguments that (1) there are no such unique repeatable 
feelings associated with the use of a word like ‘if ’ and (2) even if there were, 
they wouldn’t capture the meaning of the word (P.I., Part 2, #37–45), seem 
completely persuasive. Indeed, the ‘if-feeling’ theory of meaning for ‘if ’ seems 
like such an obvious non-starter that it is easy to see why anyone who first 
became acquainted with James through reading about it might decide that 
there was no point in wading through all (or any) of the other 1200+ pages 
of The Principles of Psychology.6 It is fortunate for James, then, that there is 
little reason to think that he was committed to anything like the ‘if-feeling’ 
theory of meaning for ‘if ’. In fact, it will be argued below that there is reason 
to doubt that Wittgenstein even attributed such a theory to James.
Now the passage that purportedly gets James into all his trouble with 
Wittgenstein runs as follows:
We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a 
feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of 
cold. Yet we do not: so inveterate has our habit become of recognizing 
the existence of substantive parts alone, that language almost refuses to 
lend itself to any other use. (PP 238)
One should note immediately that this passage only affirms the existence of the 
if-feeling, it says nothing about the feeling’s having any meaning-determining 
role. So, why should this passage, which does not explicitly endorse the if-
feeling theory, be understood as committing James to it? Even commentators 
who attribute the view to James have admitted that the textual evidence for 
the attribution is inconclusive. For instance, Goodman writes:
James does not actually say, although he suggests, that the feeling of ‘and’ is the 
meaning of the word ‘and’. In any case, this is the way Wittgenstein does take it, 
if not in Philosophical Grammar, then in The Brown Book of 1934–5, and Part 
2 of the Investigations.7
6 This was certainly the effect that it had on me as an undergraduate, and it took more 
than a little arm twisting on Richard Gale’s part for me to put those prejudices aside long 
enough to actually take a graduate seminar on James’ work.
7 Goodman, 2002, p. 75. For another resent interpretation of James as a justified target for 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument, also Boncompagni 2012, p. 41. 
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However, when we are dealing with a theory as manifestly implausible as 
the ‘if-feeling’ theory, we should look for more than a suggestion before we 
attribute it to anyone. This is especially true in James’s case, since there is 
good reason to think that, given what else he says in the Principles, he could 
not have consistently endorsed such a theory.
The if-feeling-theory is, after all, a species of what could be called ‘crude 
empiricism’ about meaning and content, since it treats our words merely as 
labels for the ‘ideas’ which constitute the ‘meanings’ of those words. There is, 
say, a fixed ‘blue-idea’ and ‘blue’ is simply a label for that idea. The if-feeling-
theory simply adds to the empiricist’s standard stock of meaning-constitutive 
ideas by claiming that words like ‘and’, ‘if ’ and ‘but’ are labels for a less salient 
ideas that had previously been ignored because of our ‘inveterate’ habit of 
recognizing only the ‘substantive’ parts of experience (PP 238).
While many have read James’s claim that we ought to say a feeling of if 
‘quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue’ as an endorsement of the if-feeling 
theory, the quotation only begins to suggest this if James already endorsed 
something like a crudely empiricist account of the meaning of ‘blue’. But, as 
we shall see, James challenges just such accounts less than 15 pages before his 
putative endorsement of the if-feeling-theory.
For instance, Wittgenstein casts doubt on the claim that there is any 
single ‘if-feeling’ by asking:
Are you sure that there is a single if-feeling, and not perhaps several? 
Have you tried saying the word in a great variety of contexts? For 
example, when it bears the principal stress of the sentence, and when 
the word next to it does. (P.I. part 2, #39.)
Goodman claims that ‘Wittgenstein examines a variety of cases, but fails to 
find the feeling that James supposed must always be there’ (Goodman 2002, 
p. 75), but Wittgenstein’s suggestion that there is no single if-feeling shared 
across contexts would hardly have been news to James, who argues that there 
is no single feeling associated with ‘blue’ or ‘cold’ either. As he puts it:
[c]lose attention to the matter shows that there is no proof that the same 
bodily sensation is ever got by us twice... What is got twice is the same 
OBJECT. We hear the same note over and over again; we see the same 
quality of green, or smell the same objective perfume, or experience the 
same species of pain. The realities, concrete and abstract, physical and 
ideal, whose permanent existence we believe in, seem to be constantly 
coming up before our thought, and lead us, in our carelessness, to 
suppose that our ‘ideas’ of them are the same ideas. (PP 225)
The belief that we have such repeatable ideas is a classic example of what 
James calls ‘the psychologist’s fallacy’, namely, the psychologist’s ‘confusion of 
his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making 
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his report’.8 This fallacy, which involves attributing to ideas properties that 
are only held by their objects is explicitly taken by James to ground classical 
empiricist psychology, and it is precisely such psychology that leads to a 
conception of language as private. As James puts it:
Naming our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume 
that as the objects are, so the thought must be. The thought of several 
distinct things can only consist of several distinct bits of thought... As 
each object may come and go, be forgotten and then thought of again, 
it is held that the thought of it has a precisely similar independence, 
self-identity, and mobility. The thought of the object’s recurrent identity 
is regarded as the identity of its recurrent thought; and the perceptions 
of multiplicity, of coexistence, of succession, are severally conceived 
to be brought about only through a multiplicity, a coexistence, a 
succession, of perceptions. The continuous flow of the mental stream is 
sacrificed, and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, 
is preached, for the existence of which no good introspective grounds 
can be brought forward...These words are meant to impeach the entire 
English psychology derived from Locke and Hume, and the entire 
German psychology derived from Herbart, so far as they both treat 
‘ideas’ as separate subjective entities that come and go. (PP 194–195, 
italics mine.)
It may be possible that over the next few pages James simply forgot all of this, 
or somehow thought that the crudely empiricist theory worked for ‘if ’ even 
though it didn’t work for ‘blue’, but it is more plausible to think that he took 
it to work for neither.
On such a reading, just as James understood a set of experiences as 
‘cold-experiences’ or ‘blue-experiences’ because they were associated with 
particular ‘concrete’ and ‘physical’ realities, he understood another set of 
experiences as ‘and-experiences’ because they were associated with particular 
‘abstract’ and ‘ideal’ realities/relations. The meanings of the terms relate to 
8 PP 195. He describes this fallacy in further detail in PP 268:
 We have the inveterate habit, whenever we try introspectively to describe one of our 
thoughts, of dropping the thought as it is in itself and talking of something else. We 
describe the things that appear to the thought, and we describe other thoughts about 
those things—as if these and the original thought were the same. If, for example, the 
thought be ’the pack of cards is on the table’, we say, ’’Well, isn’t it a thought of the pack 
of cards? Isn’t it of the cards as included in the pack? Isn’t it of the table? And of the legs 
of the table as well? The table has legs—how can you think the table without virtually 
thinking its legs? Hasn’t our thought then, all these parts—one part for the pack and 
another for the table? And within the pack-part a part for each card, as within the table-
part a part for each leg? And isn’t each of these parts an idea? And can our thought, then, 
be anything but an assemblage or pack of ideas, each answering to some element of what 
it knows?’
180 Henry Jackman
the common realities that the experiences were experiences of, not (or at least 
not just) the experiences themselves.9
It shouldn’t be surprising that James denies that there were any such 
repeatable experiences to serve as the meaning of ‘blue’, ‘cold’ or ‘if ’. The 
chapter where James discusses the if-feeling is called ‘The Stream of Thought’ 
for a reason, and one of the main conclusions of that chapter is that there are 
no ideas of the sort associated with the crudely empiricist model of meaning. 
As James puts it:
There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a 
chimera. Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the 
outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychological 
feeling, or state of mind. (PP 268.)
What we experience are things in relations, and we typically no more have a 
separate experience of things than we do of the relations themselves. In light 
of this holism about the structure of thought, James’s claim that ‘We ought 
to say ... a feeling of if ... quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue’, can be 
read as merely putting the two in the same group, and unless you think that 
the crudely empiricist account works for ‘blue’, it won’t lead you to think that 
it would work for ‘if ’. Conversely, (and importantly for Wittgenstein), if you 
don’t think that it will work for ‘if ’, then you shouldn’t endorse it for ‘blue’ 
either. The much-maligned ‘if-feeling’ passage is thus better understood in 
the context of the holistic claim that there is no unique (distinct/repeatable) 
blue-feeling than it is as the implausible suggestion that there is a unique 
meaning-determining feeling associated with ‘if ’.10
So why would Wittgenstein attribute the if-feeling theory to James? No 
one has ever accused Wittgenstein of being an overly generous interpreter of 
others, but it is not as if Wittgenstein simply remembered James’s claim from 
hearing someone else quote it out of context. Wittgenstein was actively engaged 
with James’s book for at least a decade (at one point the Principles made up 
9 ‘If there be such things as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between objects exist 
in rerum naturâ, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are 
known.’ (PP 238, italics James’s.)
10 All that said, one might still think that James commits himself to something like the 
empiricist theory of meaning soon after in ‘The Stream of Thought’ when he says that ‘… 
no word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as a mere noise. We feel its 
meaning as it passes’ (PP 271, italics mine). However, there is a large gap between saying 
that we feel a word’s meaning as it passes and saying that in such cases the meaning is 
the passing feeling. Saying that we feel the meaning as it passes no more commits us to 
meanings being feelings than saying I saw the army as it passed commits me to the army 
being a visual impression. Those inferences would follow only if our ideas were the only 
things we could feel or see, but James’s account of perception, both in the Principles and 
throughout his later work, rejects precisely the assumption that the objects of perception 
need be restricted in this way. 
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the entirety of his philosophical library),11 and he seriously considered using 
James’s Principles as the text for his graduate course at Cambridge,12 so it 
would be surprising to find that he misread James so badly. This interpretive 
problem disappears if it turns out that Wittgenstein didn’t read James this 
way, and in what follows, I’ll raise some doubts about whether the ‘if-feeling’ 
theory was ever really attributed to James by Wittgenstein.
James is not explicitly cited in the discussions of the if-feeling in the 
Investigations, and while Wittgenstein does mention James in his earlier 
discussion of the if-feeling in the Philosophical Grammar, those passages don’t 
present the feeling as a candidate for the meaning of ‘if ’, and generally don’t 
seem critical of James at all.13 Still, while James is not explicitly mentioned in 
the if-feeling sections of the Investigations, he does turn up in a similar set of 
remarks in the Brown Book that run as follows:
We think of the meaning of signs sometimes as states of mind of the 
man using them, sometimes as the role which the signs are playing in a 
system of language. The connection between these two ideas is that the 
mental experiences which accompany the use of a sign undoubtedly 
are caused by our usage of the sign in a particular usage of language. 
William James speaks of specific feelings accompanying the use of 
such words as ‘and’, ‘if ’, ‘or’. And there is no doubt that at least certain 
gestures are often connected with such words.... And there obviously 
are visual and muscular sensations connected with these gestures. 
On the other hand it is clear enough that these sensations do not 
accompany every use of the word ‘not’ and ‘and’. If in some language 
the word ‘but’ meant what ‘not’ means in English, it is clear that we 
should not compare the meaning of these two words by comparing 
the sensations which they produce. ... But we do not want to deny 
that the people who use the word ‘but’ as ‘not’ is used in English will, 
broadly speaking have similar sensations accompanying the word ‘but’ 
to those the English have when they use ‘not’. And the world ‘but’ in 
11 Though there may be some dispute about just what version of James’s Psychology 
Wittgenstein was reading. Nubiola suggest that Anscombe said that Wittgenstein only 
read Psychology: The Briefer Course, rather than the full Principles of Psychology. (He cites 
Haack (1982, p. 163, n.1) as source for this (Nubiola 2000, p. 3)). On the other hand, 
Passmore (1957, p. 428, n. 2.) seems to suggest that the full Principles was what James was 
reading.
12 For a discussion of the extent of Wittgenstein’s engagement with the Principles and how, 
see especially Goodman 2002, ch. 3. 
13 See Goodman 2002, p. 60. The passage in question reads: ‘A man who reads a sentence 
in a familiar language experiences the different parts of speech in quite different ways. 
(Think of the comparison with meaning-bodies.) We quite forget that the written and 
spoken words for ‘not’, ‘table’ and ‘green’ are similar to each other. It is only in a foreign 
language that we see clearly the uniformity of words. (Compare William James on the 
feelings that correspond to words like ‘not’, ‘but’ and so on.)’ (Wittgenstein 1974, 58). 
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the two languages will on the whole be accompanied by different sets 
of experiences. (Wittgenstein 1958, 78–9)
In this quote, Wittgenstein claims that James talks about the existence of the 
if-feeling, but, once again, he doesn’t attribute to him any commitment to its 
being meaning-determining.
Wittgenstein may, then, not be so much criticizing James as working with 
him.14 James argues in ‘The Stream of Thought’ that the dominant strains in 
both the ‘empiricist’ and ‘intellectualist’ traditions deny that there were any 
experiences of relations (the empiricists denying that any ideas corresponded 
to the words in question, while the intellectualists took such ideas to be 
imposed a priori on experience), and his main concern in those passages 
is arguing for the existence of such experiences, not for their meaning-
determining role.
The mere existence of such experiences is, however, bad news for the 
crude empiricist about linguistic and thought content, since the empiricist 
theory seems so implausible if extended to terms like ‘if ’ and ‘but’. By helping 
himself to James’s phenomenological claim, Wittgenstein can thus present 
the crudely empiricist position in as poor a light as possible. Consider, for 
instance, the following passage from The Big Typescript:
What do we want to understand by the ‘meaning’ of a word? A 
characteristic feeling that accompanies the uttering (hearing) of the 
word? (James’s and-feeling, if-feeling.) Or do we want to use the word 
‘meaning’ completely differently; and say, for instance, two words 
have the same meaning if the same grammatical rules apply to both? 
(Wittgenstein 2005, p. 29)
James can be read here (and may have been read by Wittgenstein) not 
as offering an account of the meaning of the words in question, but as 
a source for the existence of a particular set of feelings for which the 
crudely empiricist account seems highly implausible.15
After all, Wittgenstein’s question would have considerably 
less rhetorical force if he took his examples from the stock of cases 
considered by Russell,16 as the following modification of the quotation 
immediately above should make clear.
What do we want to understand by the ‘meaning’ of a word? A 
characteristic feeling that accompanies the uttering (hearing) of the 
14 Which is, of course, how Goodman characterizes Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of this 
bit of James in the Philosophical Grammar (Goodman 2002, p. 60). 
15 So the quote need not be, as Goodman suggests (2002, p. 76), a case where Wittgenstein 
‘attributes to James the idea that meanings are states of mind’.
16 See, for instance, fifth chapter of his The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 1912).
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word? (Russell’s pain-feeling, white-feeling.) Or do we want to use the 
word ‘meaning’ completely differently; and say, for instance, two words 
have the same meaning if the same grammatical rules apply to both?
If we stick to more typical examples like ‘pain’ or ‘white’ the crudely empiricist 
theory does have a certain appeal, an appeal which disappears quickly when 
Wittgenstein helps himself to the broader palette of psychological phenomena 
found in James’s Principles of Psychology. James’s work serves as a remedy for 
the ‘one-sided diet’ of examples that can make theories like crude empiricism 
tempting.17 Earlier empiricists could duck these cases by suggesting that since 
there were no experiences associated with such words, they must pick out 
relations between ideas rather than ideas themselves, but once one accepts 
James’s phenomenological claims, that line of defense becomes unavailable.
3. Conceptions and the ‘Constancy of the Mind’s Meanings’
Reading the if-feeling passages as an extension of, rather than criticism 
of, crude empiricism is just one symptom of the general tendency to treat 
James as endorsing the kind ‘idea-based’ theory of meaning targeted by 
Wittgenstein’s private-language argument.18 This tendency to see James as 
presenting a classic version of a private language might seem strange given 
that, for the classic private linguist, words pick out private, repeatable ideas, 
which only the thinker has access to, and James seems to deny precisely that 
such ideas exist. Wittgenstein’s criticisms of private sensation language relate 
to the question of how the speaker can really know whether the sensation he 
is applying a term to now is the same as the one he applied it to before, but 
for James such worries make no sense. Ideas are never repeated, so we could 
know whether or not our words are being prompted by the same ideas that 
they were before, it’s just that the answer is always that they aren’t, and so 
no notion of correctness can be based on conformity to the ideas originally 
attached to our words.
17 ‘A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking 
with only one kind of example.’ P.I. 593. (For a discussion of how Wittgenstein might 
have used James’s ‘acute sense of the variety of human experience’ to keep his diet well 
rounded, see Goodman 2002, pp. 3, 62, 82.) 
18 Goodman, for instance, argues that when James thinks about linguistic meaning, he 
‘sees experiences as the only candidates’ (Goodman 2002, p. 75), and how this general 
understanding leads to his interpretation of the if-feeling passages can be seen in claims 
such as:
 The audience for Wittgenstein’s question, ‘Are you sure there is a single if-feeling’ is, 
firstly, William James; and secondly, all who agree with him that a feeling does or could 
constitute the meaning of a term. (Goodman 2002, p. 76)
 It was obvious for James to search for meaning among the specific feelings accompanying 
the use of such words as ‘and’ and ‘or’—but this obvious first step was ‘the one that 
altogether escapes notice’ (PI, 308). (Goodman 2002, p. 120.)
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One might respond to this by arguing that even if James thinks that 
every particular thought is different, they may still share common features, 
and it is the repeatable elements in those states that are being picked out as 
the ‘private’ meanings of our terms.19 However, James seems to rule out even 
such an ‘abstractionist’ fallback position when he writes:
In short, it is logically impossible that the same thing should be known 
as the same by two successive copies of the same thought. As a matter 
of fact, the thoughts by which we know that we mean the same thing 
are apt to be very different indeed from each other. We think the thing 
now in one context, now in another; now in a definite image, now in a 
symbol. Sometimes our sense of its identity pertains to the mere fringe, 
sometimes it involves the nucleus, of our thought. (PP 454)
Indeed, much of the Principles’s chapter titled ‘Conception’ is dedicated to 
criticizing precisely the assumption that a general idea would require such 
a ‘repeatable core’ that would be shared by all the particular experiences 
of its instances. It is another version of the fallacy described earlier where 
‘The thought of the object’s recurrent identity is regarded as the identity of 
its recurrent thought’ (PP 194). In particular, he thinks that this assumption 
draws from the further assumption that for an idea to be about something 
external to it, it must somehow resemble that thing. As James puts it:
It is easy to lay bare the false assumption which underlies the whole 
discussion of the question as hitherto carried on. That assumption 
is that ideas, in order to know, must be cast in the exact likeness of 
whatever things they know, and that the only things that can be known 
are those which ideas can resemble. (PP 445)
By contrast, James thinks that ‘All that a state of mind need do, in order to 
take cognizance of a reality, intend it, or be ‘about’ it, is to lead to a remoter 
state of mind which either acts upon the reality or resembles it’ (PP 445).20 
What is essential to our thoughts’ being about various objects and properties 
is their eventually ‘acting upon’ such realities, not their resembling them. 
Since this ‘acting upon’ takes place in an external (and public) environment, 
there is no reason to treat the resultant meanings as ‘private.’ You know what 
I mean by ‘blue’ not by looking in to my mind, but by seeing which things I 
treat as ‘blue’. My dog-ideas are all dog-ideas not because they all have some 
common subjective kernel, but because they are all about dogs, and James 
sees no reason why the latter should require the former.
That said, even generally sympathetic commentators such as Gale and 
Goodman assume that James must be committed to a picture of language 
19 This seemed to be one line that Goodman took in his response to an earlier version of 
this paper (Jackman 2004).
20 For a more extended discussion of this, see Jackman 1998, forthcoming.
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as private given what other things James says in that very same chapter on 
‘Conception’. Nevertheless, I’ll argue in what follows that the relevant passages 
from the chapter on conception are better read as presenting a view very 
different from the one Goodman and Gale assume that James is endorsing.
Before discussing James’s position in that twelfth chapter, it may be 
worth making a few remarks about James’s use of the word ‘conception’, since 
it is importantly different from the usage most familiar from contemporary 
philosophical discussion. Philosophers typically distinguish concepts from 
conceptions in terms of concepts being objective and public and conceptions 
being private and subjective, so that while we all may share the same water 
concept, our conceptions of water are all different (and changing all the time as 
well). If conceptions are understood this way, tying meanings to conceptions 
would push one towards a picture of language as private, so it is important to 
stress that this is not the way that James understands conceptions here. Rather, 
James thinks of conceptions in terms of neither objects in the world, nor 
mental states, but rather in terms of the relations between them. As he puts it:
The function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct and 
permanent subject of discourse is called CONCEPTION; ...The word 
‘conception’ is unambiguous. It properly denotes neither the mental 
state nor what the mental state signifies, but the relation between the 
two, namely, the function of the mental state in signifying just that 
particular thing. (PP 436)21
Since conception is ‘the function by which a state of mind means to think the 
same whereof it thought on a former occasion’, two states of mind will ‘be two 
editions of the same conception just so far as either does mean to think what 
the other thought; but no farther’ (PP 442).22
It is precisely this purported phenomenon of one state of mind ‘meaning 
to think what another one does’ that Gale thinks pushes James towards a 
21 James then (to contemporary ears somewhat perversely) goes on to take ‘Concept’ to 
more properly pick out the subjective state: ‘the thoughts which are [a conception’s] 
vehicles are called concepts’ (PP 436). He recognizes that ‘the word ’concept’ is often 
used as if it stood for the object of discourse itself ’ and concludes that ‘this looseness 
feeds such evasiveness in discussion that I shall avoid the use of the expression concept 
altogether, and speak of ’conceiving state of mind’ or something similar, instead.’ (PP 
436). Later on in the Principles, in the chapter on ‘The Perception of “Things”’ (PP, 
Ch. 19), James reverts to more familiar terminology, stressing ‘the difference between 
our psychological conceptions and what are called concepts in logic. In logic a concept is 
unalterable; but what are popularly called our ‘conceptions of things’ alter by being used’ 
(PP 753). James sticks with this later terminology in subsequent writings such as the 
discussion of Precepts and Concepts in Some Problems of Philosophy. 
22 Note that this will allow James to tie conceptions to their extensions while still being able 
to insist that, say, ‘hesperus’ and ‘phosphorus’ are tied to different conceptions, since, 
even if they, in fact, pick out the same object, they are not intended by the speakers to 
do so. In more contemporary terms, ‘anaphoric’ co-reference types conceptions, mere co-
reference isn’t enough.
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conception of language as private. For instance, James states that we are able 
to form general conceptions, because of:
A fundamental psychical peculiarity which may be entitled ‘the 
principle of constancy in the mind’s meanings’, and which may be thus 
expressed: ‘The same matters can be thought of in successive portions of 
the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean 
the same matters which the other portions meant’. One might put it 
otherwise by saying that ‘the mind can always intend, and know when 
it intends, to think of the Same’. (PP 434, italics James’s)
This ‘peculiarity’ is later framed as the fact that ‘we can at any moment 
think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of ’, and 
this ‘ultimate law of our intellectual constitution’ (PP 920) can easily be 
understood in a way that quickly makes James seem like a private linguist.23
Gale is certainly right to think that ‘the principle of constancy in the 
mind’s meanings’ plays an important role for James, but he gives it an 
unjustifiably ‘epistemic’ reading. In particular, Gale takes a principle of 
James’s which is about our authority about the commitments we take on, 
and changes it into a principle about our authority about whether those 
commitments have been satisfied.
This principle or law is of a subjective character, as it is the subject’s 
‘intention ... to think of the same’, about which he cannot be mistaken, 
that determines the extension of his general concept over time (PP 
435). ‘Each thought decides, by its own authority’, whether it’s present 
content is an instance of what it formerly intended to count as an 
instance of the same concept. (Gale 1999, p. 164)
Gale concludes from this24 that, for James, ‘each subject follows an in-
principle private rule in determining which individuals count as instances 
of a given general concept. He and he alone knows whether he is following 
his intentions to call these experiences instances of this concept’ (Gale 
1999, p. 164).
Gale then argues that James’s so-called commitment to the privacy 
of language finds an even clearer expression in James’s final work, Some 
Problems of Philosophy. In that book, James claims that with a general term 
like, say, ‘white’, we can gather together into its extension instances of white 
that differ in their experienced color, provided that ‘we mean that our word 
shall unalterably signify’ a color common to them all (Gale 1999, p. 164). The 
23 Goodman agrees with Gale that ‘James embraces a key component of the private language 
position in the ‘Conception’ chapter of The Principles’, and that this key component is 
the assumption that ‘I have the power to determine a thought as ‘the same thought’.’ 
(Goodman 2002, pp. 105, 109.). 
24 Indeed, the link between what follows and the quotation immediately above is simply ‘In 
other words…’.
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passage Gale quotes from immediately above, and goes on to quote at greater 
length, runs as follows:
[W]e know that under all modifications wrought by changing light, 
dirt, impurity in pigment, etc., there is an element of color-quality, 
different from other color-qualities, which we mean that our word 
shall inalterably signify. The impossibility of isolating and fixing this 
quality physically is irrelevant, so long as we can isolate and fix it 
mentally, and decide that whenever we say ‘white’ that identical quality, 
whether applied rightly or wrongly, is what we shall be held to mean. 
Our meanings can be the same as long as we intend to have them so. 
(SPP 57)
Gale then pushes James’s discussion of the possibility of error suggested 
in the passage above (the admission that the term can be applied ‘rightly 
or wrongly’) in a surprising direction, effectively doubling down on his 
‘epistemic’ reading of our ability to ‘think the same’ by insisting:
James does allow for the possibility of the speaker ‘rightly or wrongly’ 
applying ‘white’, but only the speaker is able to determine whether he 
is correctly adhering to his own private rule. The reason is that his 
paradigm of whiteness, which is a mental image private to himself, is 
not in principle accessible to anyone else. It is Wittgenstein’s beetle 
in the matchbox that is observable only by the matchboxe’s owner. 
Therefore no one else can check up on the speaker to determine 
whether he is consistently adhering to his rule always to call things 
white that have the same color as his mental paradigm of whiteness. 
(Gale 165, italics mine)
Given what we’ve seen before, it’s hard to see how we could expect James to 
think that the meaning of ‘white’ could be determined by some private ‘mental 
paradigm of whiteness’. If our mental states are taken to be unrepeatable, 
there would be no way for the subject to access this ‘mental image private 
to himself ’ meant to serve as a stable qualitative paradigm for the term that 
would allow him to ‘adhere to his own private intention always to call things 
‘white’ that have the same color as the specimen he has mentally isolated and 
officially dubbed as the standard of whiteness’ (Gale 164–165).
In light of these problems, I would argue that the passages above are 
better read as relating to the subject’s ability to decide that he means the same 
thing by ‘white’ today as he did yesterday, than it is as claiming that the subject 
has the ability to tell whether a currently confronted sample (correctly) falls 
under his concept of ‘white’. That one could have such authority about the 
commitments one takes on isn’t that surprising, and deciding that one means 
by a term what one did yesterday doesn’t require any particular epistemic 
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achievement unless you are already committed to something like crude 
empiricism about the content of our thoughts. When I say:
John went to the store. He was planning to buy a bag of nails.
I can know that ‘John’ and ‘He’ pick out the same person simply because I 
intend them too, the reference of ‘he’ in this case is structurally (or in more 
contemporary terms, anaphorically—in the broad ‘discourse anaphora’ sense), 
dependent on the referent of ‘John’ and doesn’t have its reference determined 
independently. 25 In much the same way, if I say.
John never liked Peter. I’m not sure why, but it’s probably because he is 
such a snob.
I can decide whether ‘he’ refers to John or Peter, and this isn’t because I’m 
particularly good at inspecting the idea associated with ‘he’ and recognizing 
that it matches the idea associated with, say, ‘Peter’.26 The connection is 
structurally/anaphorically rather than epistemically determined.
Talking of these connections as ‘anaphoric’ is perhaps a somewhat 
anachronistic way of putting the point, but it serves to highlight that James 
25 Of course, the two sentences could be uttered in a context where ‘He’ was used 
demonstratively and I just happened to think that John was the person being 
demonstrated, but the existence of such contexts doesn’t take away from the relevance of 
the more typical cases where the co-reference is determined anaphorically.
26 Goodman takes issue with James’s claim that:
 Each thought decides, by its own authority, which, out of all the conceptive functions 
open to it, it shall now renew; with which other thought it shall identify itself as a 
conceiver, and just how far. ‘The same A which I once meant’, it says, ‘I shall now mean 
again, and mean it with C as its predicate (or what not) instead of B, as before’ (PP, 442 
n. 6).
 According to Goodman, 
 Each thought at a moment has the ‘authority’, James is saying, to constitute meaning, and 
it can do so apart from ‘everything else in the world’: ‘Conceptualism says the mind can 
conceive any quality or relation it pleases, and mean nothing but it, in isolation from 
everything else in the world. This is, of course, the doctrine we have professed’ (PP, 
444). Because of his tendency to treat both meaning and the self from ‘an exclusively 
first-person perspective’ James may thus have been one of Wittgenstein’s targets in his 
discussions of a private language, although Wittgenstein does not cite the passages 
previously mentioned either in the Investigations or in his Notebooks. (Goodman 2002, 
pp. 105–106)
 Goodman here seems to be assuming that the phrase ‘in isolation from everything else 
in the world’ entails that James is saying that our meaning-constituting activities can take 
place ‘in isolation’ (so that it would be some pure mental act that requires no physical 
context). I’d argue instead that he is suggesting that the meanings constituted pick out 
particular properties ‘in isolation’ from everything else, so, say the concept of triangle 
picks out the shape in isolation from the colors, textures, and other properties that 
particular triangles may have. (This sense that concepts “exclude” all but their chosen 
aspect of the material they conceptualize is a running theme throughout James’s work.)
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does explicitly describe this sameness as a function of the mind’s structure 
rather than, say the phenomenal content of the ideas passing through it.
Note, however, that we are, in the first instance speaking of the sense 
of sameness from the point of view of the mind’s structure alone, and 
not from the point of view of the universe. We are psychologizing, 
not philosophizing. That is, we [we psychologists, not we thinkers 
in general] do not care whether there be any real sameness in things 
or not, or whether the mind be true or false in its assumptions of it. 
Our principle only lays it down that the mind makes continual use of 
the notion of sameness, and if deprived of it, would have a different 
structure from what it has. In a word, the principle that the mind can 
mean the Same is true of its meanings, but not necessarily of aught 
besides. (PP 435, italics James’s, boldface mine.)
Note that his denial that there must be any ‘real sameness’ applies just as much 
to our ideas as to objects in the world, and for the mind to be structured so 
that items are recognized as the same, it doesn’t need to have ideas which are 
themselves identical. That said, while ‘the law of constancy in our meaning’ 
is ‘the most important of all the features of our mental structure’ (PP. 435), 
James isn’t really full of details about just how these structural connections 
work, insisting instead that:
Introspective psychology must here throw up the sponge; the 
fluctuations of subjective life are too exquisite to be arrested by its 
coarse means. It must confine itself to bearing witness to the fact that 
all sorts of different subjective states do form the vehicle by which the 
same is known; and it must contradict the opposite view. (PP 454)
This sort of structural connection is, of course, not limited to proper names 
and pronouns, and James makes the same sort of point about general terms 
like ‘white’. What we are doing is not making the epistemic determination 
that a set of ideas are identical, but rather making the stipulation that a set of 
non-identical ideas are intended to pick out the same object or property. I can 
mean dog by ‘dog’ because (as we saw earlier) I can take all of the instances of 
‘dog’ that I use to mean the same thing. However, my meaning the same thing 
by ‘dog’ as I meant yesterday is not some sort of epistemic achievement. It is 
not as if I need to inspect my dog-idea and remember yesterday’s dog-idea 
reliably enough for me to judge that they are identical.
On such a reading, just because we can always intend to apply to a 
particular experience the same concept that we applied to another earlier 
experience, it does not follow that we need be correct in doing so (in either 
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case).27 Quite the contrary, one might argue that it is precisely this doctrine 
that lets James account for error in a way that a traditional empiricist might 
not be able to. For instance, when I sincerely claim
(W) The piece of paper in front of me is white.
James can claim that my concept of ‘white’ is determined by me to be identical 
to the concept I applied last month, even if I can’t remember precisely what 
experiences I had back then. Indeed, someone who has better access to what 
I had applied the term to before might be better able to judge whether or 
not (W) was correct than I am. Without this ability to stipulate constancy of 
meaning, such mistakes would seem hard to explain. If I sincerely asserted 
(W), and what I meant by ‘white’ at the time were limited to what I could 
either call up in memory or perceive in front of me, then a crucial standard 
against which current use is judged, past use, would drop out.
James’s ‘principle of constancy’ does not require that we can somehow 
inspect past ideas and recreate them within our current thoughts unchanged. 
Quite the opposite. Since, the constancy is more structural than resemblance 
driven, the claim that what a speaker means by ‘white’ is ‘is a mental image 
private to himself ’ (Gale 1999, p. 165) has no real support from these passages 
from James. Such support would only come if one thought that constancy 
required the ability to pull up an identical (or at least extremely similar) 
experience in memory, and there is no reason to believe that James thought 
anything like this.28
James is instead better read as suggesting that what a word like ‘white’ 
is intended to pick out is not some private mental image, but rather the 
property that we presume that all/most of the things that we call white have 
in common. We may not know just what that shared quality is, but that 
doesn’t prevent us from intending to pick out the shared property behind the 
occasions of the term’s use.29 When James says:
27 In fact, James’s claim “Our meanings can be the same as long as we intend to have them 
so, quite irrespective of whether what is meant be a physical possibility or not” (SPP 
57), suggests that for some terms every particular application of the concept to external 
objects might be mistaken (this last point does a lot of work in the Principles’s 28th 
chapter on necessary truth). 
28 As mentioned earlier, James doubts about the repeatability of ideas would suggest 
just the opposite, and while the chapters of the Principles can often be somewhat 
disconnected from each other (a function of both its length, James’s style, and the 12 
years spent in its composition), James explicitly calls back to this aspect of the “The 
Stream of Thought” in his chapter on conception, reminding us that “nothing can be 
conceived twice over without being conceived in entirely different states of mind” (PP 453, 
italics James’s).
29 Note that James’s view is presented here in the context of his rejecting that ‘nominalistic’ 
view that ‘white’ just picks out the property being called ‘white’ (SPP 56–57).
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The impossibility of isolating and fixing this quality physically is 
irrelevant, so long as we can isolate and fix it mentally, and decide that 
whenever we say ‘white’ that identical quality, whether applied rightly 
or wrongly, is what we shall be held to mean. (SPP 57).
He is not saying, in the absence of discovering the precise physical property 
that all the things we call ‘white’ share, we focus instead on some qualitative 
mental property that we take to be the meaning of the term. Rather, he is 
saying that we can pick out the shared property by the intention to refer to 
the property, whatever it is, that the structurally/anaphorically linked uses of 
the term have in common.30
This may be less obvious with ‘white’ where the mentalistic understanding 
of the term’s meaning might be tempting, but James is making a general point 
about our concepts in this section, not just our phenomenal ones, and James’s 
point seems clearer with a term such as ‘water’, in which case the passage 
would read:
The impossibility of isolating and fixing this property physically is 
irrelevant, so long as we can isolate and fix it mentally, and decide 
that whenever we say ‘water’ that identical property, whether applied 
rightly or wrongly, is what we shall be held to mean. Our meanings can 
be the same as long as we intend to have them so.
Even if we don’t know just how the property is specified (ie: we can’t ‘fix it 
physically’) we can have a general intention to pick the underlying property 
out. James’s claim that ‘“White” means a colour-quality which the mind 
creates (following no matter what cue) and which it can decree to be there 
under all physical disguises’ (SPP 57, italics mine) is about positing an 
underlying property that the term picks out, a property which we could 
be wrong in attributing in individual instances. Once again, while error is 
explicitly allowed for here, it would not seem to be possible on the nominalist 
view (where white is just the property of being called ‘white’) that James is 
criticizing in those pages.
In short, James’s discussion of concepts/conceptions in the Principles’s 
chapter on conception and in Some Problems of Philosophy fails to supports 
the contention that he understood meaning in a way that would have run 
afoul of the private language argument, since there is no suggestion in either 
that he thinks that we can always re-identify our ideas in terms of their 
phenomenal properties.
30 Such chains of anaphorically linked ideas are crucial for James’s account of singular 
reference as well. James, claims, for instance, that our idea of Memorial Hall refers to 
Memorial Hall because if asked to find Memorial Hall, I could go to Cambridge and 
identify the correct building. However, the ability of the perception to determine the 
reference of a concept entertained weeks, months, or even years before depends on the 
existence of such anaphoric links. (Needless to say, ‘anaphoric’ is not the way James 
describes such links.) (See Jackman 1998, forthcoming.)
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4. Conclusion
There remain, of course, serious differences between Wittgenstein and 
James,31 but (whether Wittgenstein really appreciated this or not) the question 
of whether meaning should be understood as ‘private’ is not one of them. 
The perceived distance between Wittgenstein and the (other) Pragmatists 
has certainly contracted over the years,32 and seeing how one of Pragmatism’s 
founders was not committed to one of Wittgenstein’s particular bête noires 
should hopefully close that gap further.
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